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Abstract
This paper studies monetary and ﬁscal policy interactions in a two country model,
where taxes on ﬁrms’ sales are optimally chosen and the monetary policy is set cooper-
atively. It turns out that in a two country setting non-cooperative ﬁscal policy makers
have an incentive to change taxes on sales depending on shocks realizations in order
to reduce output production. Therefore whether the ﬁscal policy is set cooperatively
or not matters for optimal monetary policy decisions. Indeed, as already shown in
the literature, the cooperative monetary policy maker implements the ﬂexible price
allocation only when special conditions on the value of the distortions underlying the
economy are met. However, if non-cooperative ﬁscal policy makers set the taxes on
ﬁrms’ sales depending on shocks realizations, these conditions cannot be satisﬁed; con-
versely, when ﬁscal policy is cooperative, these conditions are fulﬁlled. We conclude
that whether implementing the ﬂexible price allocation is optimal or not depends on
the ﬁscal policy regime.
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11 Introduction
There is a large literature that analyzes the interactions1 between monetary and ﬁscal
policies in the closed economy environment. This literature usually considers, in a
ﬂexible price setting, the problem of the optimal policy choice in presence only of
distortionary taxes; yet it has been recently integrated into frameworks with nominal
rigidities2. It happens otherwise for the open economy set up. At least when a two
country framework is examined, the analysis of the interactions between monetary and
ﬁscal policies when prices are rigid has been normally limited to the case in which the
ﬁscal policy instrument is public expenditure ﬁnanced by lump sum taxes3.
By assuming always a cooperative monetary policy, this paper studies monetary
and ﬁscal policy interactions in the framework of Benigno and Benigno (2003) where
there are two countries, prices are set one period in advance and ﬁscal policy is set
either cooperatively or non-cooperatively .
Benigno and Benigno (2003) analysis determines under which conditions imple-
menting the ﬂexible price allocation is the optimal monetary policy both for the co-
operative and the non-cooperative case. According to their ﬁndings in general4, while
the non-cooperative policy makers do not implement the ﬂexible price allocation, the
cooperative monetary policy makers do it only if the ﬁrms revenue tax rates are equal
across countries. Our analysis is devoted to examine when this last condition is satisﬁed
once ﬁscal policy choices on ﬁrms’ revenue tax rates are endogenized.
The key diﬀerence with respect to the open economy literature is that the ﬁscal
policy instrument is not government expenditure. The key diﬀerence with respect to
the closed economy one is the presence of lump sum taxes. This simplifying assumption
allows to keep the model tractable. But, more importantly, it surfaces the following
implication of the two country framework: when prices are ﬂexible, non-cooperative
ﬁscal policy authorities have an incentive to use tax rates strategically in order to
inﬂuence the terms of trade. In fact, under complete markets, being consumption equal
across countries, non-cooperative ﬁscal planners seek to externalize output production
by adjusting ﬁrm tax rates. Because of this incentive, despite the presence of the
lump sum taxes, optimal ﬁrm tax rates are state dependent. As a consequence when
ﬁscal policy is set non-cooperatively there is a motive for endogenous movements of the
wedge in the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and good production
which turn out to matter for monetary policy decisions. If ﬁscal policy is set non-
cooperatively the cooperative optimal monetary policy maker does not implement the
ﬂexible price allocation while, when ﬁscal policy is set cooperatively, implementing the
ﬂexible price allocation is always optimal. Which is the optimal coordinated monetary
policy depends on the ﬁscal policy regime.
These conclusions are relevant for the analysis of international policy interactions.
First of all at the European level. EMU birth has empathized the question of how
1See for all Chari and Kehoe (1999).
2See Correia, Nicolini and Teles (2001), Schmitte-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004), Siu (2004) and Benigno and
Woodford (2003).
3See for example Lombardo and Sutherland (2004), Gal´ ı and Monacelli (2005) and Beetsma and Jensen
(2005).
4...i.e. unless either shocks are symmetric or special parameter restrictions are met.
2to frame international institutions and regulations for conducting ﬁscal and monetary
policies. The Maastricht Treaty has delegated the control of monetary policy to the
ECB and has provided for EMU country ﬁscal discipline through the Growth Stability
Pact. Underlying this institutional design there is the fear that undisciplined ﬁscal
policies may force the ECB to give up the pursuit of price stability. Actually this should
be a main objective of the ECB itself. However, according to our results, pursuing
price stability is not, in general, the optimal cooperative monetary policy when ﬁscal
policy authorities do not coordinate. Therefore the fact that, while complying the
Growth Stability Pact, EMU countries still run autonomously the ﬁscal policy may be
inconsistent with the idea that the ECB optimal policy is to pursue price stability.
Even at the global level there is concern about the spillover eﬀects produced by
uncoordinated policies that the last decades increasing interdependence has rendered
more relevant. An extensive literature analyzes the need of policy coordination for
either monetary or ﬁscal policy. Our ﬁndings suggest that for the analysis of optimal
cooperative monetary policy whether ﬁscal policy is set cooperatively or not matters.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to present the basic frame-
work. Section 3 analyzes the optimal cooperative and non-cooperative ﬁscal policies
when prices are ﬂexible. Section 4 studies the conditions under which the cooperative
monetary policy maker implements the ﬂexible price allocation. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
The basic framework belongs to the new generation of open economy stochastic general
equilibrium models5. The world consists of two countries, Home and Foreign which
have diﬀerent currencies but a cooperative monetary policy. Conversely ﬁscal policy is
conducted by single country authorities that may or may not coordinate.
2.1 Preferences
Each country is populated by a continuum of agents: [0,n) and [n,1] respectively.
Agents are, at the same time, consumers and monopolistic producers of a single dif-


















0 < β < 1 (1)
where β is the intertemporal discount factor and E is the expectation operator
conditional on the information set at time 0; u and L are concave functions respectively
increasing in a consumption index Cj and in the money demand Mj
P ; V is an increasing
convex function in agent j produced good y(j) and a country speciﬁc shock z. Foreign
country agent preferences are represented by a utility function symmetric to (1) where
foreign variables are denoted by an asterisk7.
5See, in particular, Benigno and Benigno (2003) and Benigno (2004).
6Therefore [0,n) and [n,1] indicate the continuum of both agents and goods.
7This convention will be used from now on.
3Price and consumption indexes
Each agent consumes all the varieties of goods. Actually, the home country consump-

















θ > 0 (2)
with θ indicating the elasticity of substitution between CH and CF. The latter



























where c(h) is the diﬀerentiated good produced in country H, c(f) the diﬀerentiated
good produced in country F and σ is the elasticity of substitution between goods
produced in the same country.
Consumption index deﬁnitions (2) and (3) allow to determine consistent deﬁnitions




























with p(h) and p(f) being the prices of single goods produced respectively in country
H and F. There are no trading frictions. Thus the law of one price is assumed to
hold in all single good markets that is p(h) = ξp∗(f), being ξ the nominal exchange
rate. Consequently, according to consumption and price indexes deﬁnitions, even the
purchasing power parity holds. In other words PH = ξP∗
H, PF = ξP∗
F and P = ξP∗.
2.2 Consumption, portfolio choices and money demand
The Dixit-Stiglitz structure of preferences and consumption and price indexes allows
to solve the consumer problem in three stages. In the ﬁrst two stages, agents decide
how much of real net income to spend for goods produced within a country both at
single and aggregate levels. According to the set of optimal conditions, it is possible to
8Namely price and consumption indexes are such that expenditures for total consumption,
R 1
0 p(k)c(k)dk,




n p(f)c(f)df, are respectively equal to PC
and PHCH and PFCF.













































































F for j ∈ [n,1] (7)
The third stage of the agent j optimization problem coincides with the standard con-


















which states that nominal saving, net of lump sum transfers and ﬁrms’ revenue
taxes has to equalize the money holding Mj and the nominal value of a state contingent
portfolio. In fact p(j) indicates agent j output price, while [ps] is the pricing vector of
a one-period maturity portfolio that pays As,j when the state of the world s occurs.
The assumption underlying (8) is that domestic and international capital markets are
complete. Moreover the state contingent wealth at time zero is such that the lifetime
discounted budget constraints are identical across agents. These hypotheses jointly
with the preferences speciﬁcation in (1) entail that aggregate consumptions are equal




















where π(st+1|st) represents the probability that state s occurs at time t + 1, given
the all past history of states up to period t10. Hence, according to (9), the cost of
a marginal unit of state s contingent payoﬀ should be equal to the marginal rate of
substitution between next period state s contingent consumption and current period
consumption. Combining conditions given in (9) it is possible to verify that there is





which implicitly states that Cj = C∗l for any j and l with j ∈ [0,n) and l ∈ [n,1].
9...and subject to the condition that relates single good demand, yd(h), with the aggregate consumption
C which will be determined later on.
10Implicitly (9) states that ps
t+1 = π(st+1|st)Q
j
t,t+1 where Qt,t+1 denotes what is usually called the stochas-
tic discount factor.
5Moreover the optimality conditions of the consumer problem allow to derive the
implicit money demand function. If there are complete markets, then, by non-arbitrage,







t+1ds = Et(Qt,t+1) (11)
Namely the price of a riskless portfolio should be equal to the price of a riskless














that is at the optimum the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
real balances is equal to the opportunity cost of keeping one unit more of real balances.
Single good demands and aggregate outputs


















where CW ≡ nC+(1−n)C∗ = C = C∗. At the same time, by properly aggregating


































The last conditions make clear that output divergences across countries are ex-
plained by movements of the terms of trade11.
2.3 Monetary and ﬁscal policy makers
Our analysis is focused on ﬁscal and monetary policy interactions, when monetary
policy is run cooperatively. Thus the monetary policy makers main objective is always














On the contrary for ﬁscal policy we analyze the cooperative and the non-cooperative
case. Home country ﬁscal authority faces a period by period balance budget constraint:
11In our context, the terms of trade are deﬁned as the ratio between PF and PH.
12Notice that in our set up, diﬀerently from the case of a monetary union, the monetary policy authority
relies on two instruments.
6Mt + nτtPH,tYt = Mt−1 + Tt (16)
where T ≡
R n
0 Tjdj, and nτPHY =
R n
0 p(j)y(j)dj and the money supply is taken
as given so that policy makers are instrument-independent13. Moreover lump sum
transfers are taken as a residual guaranteing that the governments budget constraint
is always satisﬁed. A symmetric constraint holds for the foreign ﬁscal authority.
2.4 Flexible price setting
When prices are ﬂexible, monopolist producers in countries H and F choose the optimal

































where conditions (17) and (18)14 are retrieved by taking into account that in the
symmetric equilibrium agents inherent in the same country set the same output price.

























clariﬁes how real marginal costs are related to the distortions present in the econ-








t ); which is to say that µ and µ∗
are determined, on the one hand, by the mark-up charged by monopolistic producers;
on the other hand, by the distorting taxes on ﬁrms’ revenue. Only when µ = 1 and
µ∗ = 1, the ﬂexible-price allocation is eﬃcient, namely coincides with the competitive
equilibrium allocation without distortionary taxes.
2.5 Preference speciﬁcation and welfare criteria












t = Mt−1 + Tt − Mt. In this sense policy authorities do not share the same budget constraint. See
Lambertini (2004).
14These conditions are derived by maximizing agent j utility with respect to p(j) and Ct, subject to the











if j ∈ [n,1] ν > 1
(20)
where ρ and ν − 1 represent the intertemporal elasticities of substitution in con-
sumption and labor supply respectively.
Policy makers are assumed to be benevolent and to commit credibly, once for all,
in the period -1. Therefore they maximize the expected weighted average of consumer

























while the central planner welfare criterium is:
nW + (1 − n)W∗ (22)
Notice that (21) and (22) do not include the utility derived from money holdings.
Thus we implicitly restrict the analysis to the cashless economy limiting case15.
3 Optimal ﬁscal policy with ﬂexible prices
Before analyzing monetary and ﬁscal policy interactions, we examine the optimal ﬁscal
policy under ﬂexible prices. In fact, as expected, under ﬂexible prices ﬁscal policy
produces real eﬀects while monetary policy does not. The main purpose of this section
is to compare non-cooperative ﬁscal policies with the cooperative one. It turns out that
non-cooperative ﬁscal authorities deviate from the cooperative policy. As a consequence
there are potential gains from coordination.
In order to compare cooperative and non-cooperative ﬁscal policies, ﬁrst of all we
need to retrieve from the appendix the ﬂexible price equilibrium levels of consumption
























































Pt , ΠF,t ≡
PF,t









, γ ≡ 1+(ν−1)θ and δ ≡ 1−ρ−ν.
Note that conditions (23), (24) and (25) give evidence of monetary policy neutrality.
15See Benigno and Benigno (2003).
16From now on we do the simplifying assumption that n = 1
2.
83.1 The cooperative case
When prices are ﬂexible the cooperative ﬁscal authority maximizes the expected weighted






























where consumption and relative prices equilibrium levels are determined according to













































































allow to retrieve the optimal tax rates as follows. Substituting the expressions (61),











































σ−1. Notice that the left hand side of (28) and of the foreign country






















































which implies that τt = τ∗
t for any t, zt and z∗
t. In other words, in the cooperative
case the ﬁscal authorities choose to equalize ﬁrms’ revenue tax rates in every period
independently of shock realizations. By so doing, output steady state levels across
countries are equalized as well and there is no need to try to correct the diﬀerences
across countries in the expected disutilities of output.
The fact that τt = τ∗
t allows to determine the optimal tax rate. Indeed if τt = τ∗
t ,
















(1 − τt) =
σ
σ − 1









= 1. Thus we can conclude:





9for any t, zt and z∗
t. Not surprisingly, when ﬁscal policy is set cooperatively, it is
optimal to subsidize ﬁrm sales in order to exactly oﬀset the monopolistic distortions.
By setting µt = µ∗
t = 1 this policy allows to implement the eﬃcient allocation.
The non-cooperative case
In the non-cooperative case the home country planner takes foreign country tax rate



















where consumption and relative price equilibrium levels are given by (23) and (24).















A symmetric condition can be retrieved for the foreign country. Plugging (63) and (61)
















































This expression deﬁnes implicitly the home country optimal tax rate as function of
exogenous shocks and foreign country strategy17. According to condition (35) we may
expect that, in general, in the non-cooperative case optimal tax rates depend on shock
realizations. This last condition allows to prove the next propositions:
Proposition 1 Under ﬂexible prices, if shocks are symmetric18, (1−τt) = (1−τ∗
t ) = σ−1
σ − 1
α
−1 is the optimal non-cooperative ﬁscal policy in all contingencies and at all





−1 is the optimal
non-cooperative ﬁscal policy in all contingencies and at all times if and only if θ = 1.
17In other words (35) represents the home country reaction function.
18i.e. zt = z∗
t in all contingencies and at all times
10Proof. Suppose τt = τ∗
t for any t. Then if shocks are symmetric Λt = 1 for any t.
As well if θ = 1 Λ
1−θ
γ
t = 1 for any t. But, if Λ
1−θ
γ










An equal condition can be stated for the foreign country. Therefore if shocks are




−1 in all contingencies and at all
times.




−1 for any t cannot be the non-cooperative optimal ﬁscal policy.
Suppose τt = τ∗
t for any t. Then by condition (35) and the correspondent condition















































Provided θ 6= 1 and Λt > 0 for any t, it is easy to see that if zt 6= z∗
t for some t (38)
cannot be satisﬁed. Then, given that shocks are asymmetric, τt 6= τ∗
t for some t. As a






be the optimal non-cooperative ﬁscal policy.
Corollary 2 Suppose 1−τt
1−τ∗
t independent of shock realizations namely 1−τt
1−τ∗
t = k. Then
under ﬂexible prices and if θ 6= 1 1−τt
1−τ∗
t can be supported as an optimal non-cooperative
ﬁscal policy only if the stochastic process of z∗
t and z∗
t satisﬁes the following restriction:
z∗
t
zt = w1 or
z∗
t

























































Proof. Taking the ratio between condition (35) and the foreign country correspon-




















































































19Moreover k should ensure that either w1 or w2 or both are real and positive numbers.
11This last condition allows to retrieve conditions (39) and (40).
According to proposition 1 the uncoordinated ﬁscal policy authorities deviate from
the coordinated optimal choice. Indeed this proposition and its proof entail that (30)
cannot be a non-cooperative optimal ﬁscal policy20. In turn corollary 2 implies that,
unless special restrictions are met, the optimal non-cooperative ﬁscal policy depends
on shock realizations.
The interpretation of these results is the following. Uncooperative ﬁscal policy
makers have a conﬂicting objective: to seek to reduce output disutility. Why this














which follows from our preference speciﬁcation and condition (14). According to con-
dition (41) ﬁscal policy makers may attempt to increase consumption utility and/or
decrease output disutility through two channels. The ﬁrst channel operates through the
indirect impact of ﬁrms’ sale tax rates on the relative prices and allows to clarify why
optimal tax rates may be adjusted to the shock ratio variations. The second channel
consists of the direct impact of ﬁrm revenue tax on (41) and contribute to explain why
uncoordinated ﬁscal policy is set suboptimally even when θ = 1. Actually in this case,
or when shocks are symmetric, the home country optimal tax rate is determined ac-
cording to (36) independently of shock realizations and, as follows from proposition 1,
is diﬀerent from the one chosen by the cooperative planner. More speciﬁcally it is easy
to show that, given the parameter restrictions stated in section 2, the non-cooperative
optimal tax rate implied by (36) is greater than the cooperative optimal one implied
by (30)22. This result substantiates the intuition that the non-cooperative ﬁscal policy
planner key incentive is to seek to externalize the disutility of producing output.
4 Optimal monetary policy with one period in
advance price setting
In this section we examine the conditions under which implementing the ﬂexible-price
allocation is the optimal cooperative monetary policy. It turns out that whether im-
plementing the ﬂexible price allocation is optimal or not depends on the ﬁscal policy
regime. In fact when ﬁscal policy is set cooperatively implementing the ﬂexible-price
allocation is always optimal. Conversely when ﬁscal policy is set non-cooperatively, im-
plementing the ﬂexible-price allocation is optimal only when appropriate restrictions
are met.
To allow monetary policy to produce real eﬀects, we assume that all prices are
20The proof of corollary 2 implies that when shocks are asymmetric there exists at least a period t such
that τt 6= τ∗
t which is inconsistent with (30).
























































where the expectation is conditional on the information set at time t − 1.
Given conditions (42) and (43) it is possible to ﬁnd the restrictions that a monetary









































F,t = 1 (45)
which holds for each time t and each contingency. Combining the ﬁrst order conditions





















Using (46) and the derivative with respect to Ct we obtain:

1 − (1 − τt)
σ − 1
σ















































The latter conditions allow to prove the next proposition:
Proposition 3 When prices are set one period in advance, if shocks are symmetric,
i.e. zt = z∗
t in all contingencies and at all times, implementing the ﬂexible price allo-
cation in all contingencies and at all times is the optimal cooperative monetary policy;
if shocks are asymmetric, implementing the ﬂexible price allocation in all contingen-
cies and at all times is the optimal cooperative monetary policy if ﬁscal policy is set
cooperatively or θ = 1.
13Proof. In order to prove the result, it is suﬃcient to show that if τt and τ∗
t are
constant and equal across countries then implementing the ﬂexible price allocation is
always the optimal cooperative monetary policy. If τt = τ∗
t in all contingencies and at
all times then:









is a solution that guarantees that the ﬂexible price allocation is always implemented.
Indeed if ∆ = Ω and τt = τ∗
t , Ξt = 0. But if Ξt = 0 and (50) is fulﬁlled then conditions




















which correspond exactly to the ﬂexible price ﬁrst order conditions (17) and (18) 23.
Corollary 4 When prices are set one period in advance, implementing the ﬂexible
price allocation in all contingencies and at all times is the optimal cooperative monetary
policy only if, at all times,
(1−τt)
(1−τ∗
t ) is independent of shock realizations.
Proof. The result can be proven by noting that, when (17) and (18) are satisﬁed, from





[θ(1 − ∆ν) − ∆(1 − θ)]
[θ(1 − Ων) − Ω(1 − θ)]
(53)
Proposition 3 may be interpreted as follows. If ﬁscal policy is set cooperatively im-
plementing the ﬂexible price allocation is always optimal for the cooperative monetary
policy. In that case, the ﬂexible price allocation is eﬃcient all the distortions present
in the economy being eliminated: the one due to the monopolistic competition through
the cooperative ﬁscal policy, the other due to the presence of nominal rigidities through
the cooperative monetary policy. However even when shocks are symmetric or θ = 1
the ﬂexible price allocation is constrained eﬃcient being ﬁrm tax rates constant and
equal across countries. In these cases the condition indicated in Benigno and Benigno
(2003) according to which implementing the ﬂexible price allocation is the optimal
cooperative monetary policy is satisﬁed.
Corollary 4 jointly with corollary 2 entails instead the following implication: in
general, unless special conditions on structural parameters or on the shock stochastic
process are met, if ﬁscal policy is set non-cooperatively, implementing the ﬂexible price
allocation is not optimal for the cooperative monetary authority. Indeed when prices
are ﬂexible, the non-cooperative ﬁscal authorities have an incentive to react to shock
ratio variations by strategically using ﬁrms’ sale tax rates. These tax rate movements
force the cooperative policy maker to depart from the ﬂexible price allocation in order
to try to stabilize the variations of the wedge in the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and good production.
23Moreover if (17) and (18) are satisﬁed even (42) and (43) are satisﬁed as well.
145 Conclusion
Our analysis adds some new insights on the interactions between optimal monetary and
ﬁscal policy in an open economy context. It clariﬁes that when prices are ﬂexible, in
general the non-cooperative ﬁscal authorities behavior generates endogenous variations
of ﬁrms’ sale tax rates. Conversely the cooperative ﬁscal policy maker chooses constant
tax rates that allow to exactly oﬀset the monopolistic distortions. As a result unless
special restrictions are met, implementing the ﬂexible price allocation is the optimal
cooperative monetary policy only when ﬁscal policy is set cooperatively.
Our analysis can be extended in diﬀerent directions. First of all by considering the
case of a monetary union. In general, in a monetary union, the common central bank
cannot implement the ﬂexible price allocation because, being the currency common to
all countries, there are not enough instruments to correct the nominal rigidities present
in the economy. However, as made clear by Benigno (2004), when the monopolistic
distortions are eliminated by appropriate subsidies the common central bank seeks to
approximate the ﬂexible price allocation through a suitable inﬂation targeting policy.
Our results suggest that this policy may be not optimal when ﬁscal policy is set non-
cooperatively because in that case not only the ﬂexible price allocation is not eﬃcient,
but also the endogenous variations of ﬁrms’ tax rates generate an additional distortion
the common central bank tries to cope with.
Secondly by using a more general framework. Abstracting from the presence of lump
sum taxes, considering a price setting a la Calvo, introducing the public expenditure
may render the set up more appropriate to investigate the interdependence between
optimal cooperative monetary policy and ﬁscal policy regime.
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16APPENDIX
Flexible price setting
Consumption and relative prices





























Pt and ΠF,t ≡
PF,t
Pt
24. Taking the ratio between (55) and (54) it is























and γ ≡ 1 + (ν − 1)θ







































































where δ ≡ 1 − ρ − ν.












17Eﬀects of tax rates marginal changes on equilibrium levels
Conditions (59) and (60) allow to derive the impact of marginal changes in home and











































































































The cooperative monetary policy problem




































































F,t = 1 (69)





















































t = 0 (70)



























t = ϕt(1−θ) (72)
where ∆, Ω and ϕt are respectively the lagrange multipliers of constraints (67), (68)

































t (1 − Ων) (73)
25Note that while the lagrange multiplier of constraint (69) is state dependent the ones of constraints (67)
and (67) are not.
19